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I t IS DIFFICULT to work out the position o f the Kyoto School philosophers on the traditional Western philosophical issue o f freedom versus deter­
minism. On the one hand they tend to  be very sympathetic to  those Western 
philosophers who oppose determinism as materialistic and reductionistic, 
while on the other hand, their Buddhist sympathies require a rejection of 
the view o f the self that is typical of those Western philosophers who defend 
free will.1 O f course, this issue has also been controversial among Western 
philosophers, many o f whom see the traditional dichotomy between freedom 
and determinism as false and seek some sort o f middle ground, often called 
soft determinism or compatibilism. Hence, it is not entirely clear how the issue 
itself is to  be understood even within a Western context. My intention in this 
article is to  try to shed some light on the Kyoto School view o f freedom and de­
terminism by examining a  classic expression o f the Kyoto School position, 
namely, the chapter on the Freedom of the Will in Nishida KitarO’s/lw  Inqui­
ry into the Good.2 My analysis involves a close reading of this chapter, and I 
urge the reader to  review it while reading this article. I will argue that Nishida 
should be included among those who deny that there is a dichotomy between 
freedom and determinism; his view should be classified as a form o f soft deter­
minism?
1 That is, a view of the self as an individual, enduring, independent agent capable of 
initiating a causal series in an absolute sense.
2 Chapter 17 in An Inquiry into the Good, translated by Masao Abe and 
Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). The original Japanese text 
was published in 1911. All references will be to this translation by Abe and Ives.
’ A classic statement by a Western philosopher of a position very similar to 
Nishida’s can be found in W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishing, Inc., 1952), pp. 248-258.
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Nishida begins his discussion of the freedom of the will in this chapter by 
reminding the reader of his view, discussed in detail earlier in the text, that the 
will is to be thought of as the most fundamental aspect of reality rather than as 
simply a part of an individual. This is connected with his view that reality is 
most accurately spoken of as “ the phenomena of consciousness”4 5 and with 
his interpretation of the process of reality as “ constructive.” 3 Nishida then 
asks whether will in this sense is free or determined.
4 See Chapter 6, “ Phenomena o f Consciousness Are the Sole Reality/* pp. 42-46.
5 See Chapter 7, “ The True Features o f  Reality,”  pp. 47-50. Nishida’s view o f the 
nature o f reality is the basis o f  his rejection o f  reductionistic, mechanistic determinism; 
see below.
6 Inquiry, p. 95.
7 Inquiry, pp. 95-96.
8 Inquiry, p. 96.
He opens his analysis by noting that people ordinarily “consider the will 
to be free.” 6 Naturally, this common view cannot be accepted by Nishida 
without considerable qualification since people also ordinarily consider the 
will to be only a part of the individual self. Hence, Nishida turns to a reflec­
tion on what is to be made of this common view of freedom. He makes two 
basic points: First, that the common experience of being free is always “ wi­
thin a certain sphere,”  that is, we see ourselves as being able either to do or to 
refrain from doing certain things in certain situations, and second, that ideas 
of responsibility, praise and blame, etc., arise from this experience.7 The rest 
of Nishida’s discussion is based on an analysis of the first of these points. He 
never returns in the Inquiry to the question of how he understands the ideas 
of responsibility, praise and blame, etc. I will offer some suggestions about 
what his position on freedom implies about these issues at the end of this arti­
cle.
Nishida focuses on the fact that the ordinary view recognizes that freedom 
only occurs “within a certain sphere”  and makes a number of claims about 
the nature of the limitations or restrictions this implies. Starting from within 
the ordinary view, which he soon moves beyond, Nishida points out that when 
we think about bodily activity in the natural world, our control of things, and 
hence our freedom of action, is obviously quite limited. Hence, we think we 
are “ truly free” only in the activity of thinking, yet even here there are limits. 
We have little control over which ideas occur to us at any given time, and, 
moreover, there are restraints built into the process of thinking as well.8 Here 
Nishida is apparently thinking of such things as the laws of logic. Thus, even 
in the ordinary view, freedom is clearly not absolute, so the question is how to 
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idea of being free that Nishida will now propose is quite substantial.
At the end of this brief analysis, Nishida adds an important additional 
claim, namely, that freedom also is only present “ when of two or more ways 
to unite ideas none has the strength to dominate.” 9 He does not claim that this 
is part of the common view of free will, and it would be difficult to defend the 
claim that it is, since people do commonly seem to assume that they are free to 
violate their most cherished principles. Nevertheless, this is a crucial element 
in Nishida’s own view, as will become clear shortly. Perhaps he is reluctant to 
directly challenge an aspect of common opinion and simply introduces an al­
ternative view in the hope that its greater plausibility will lead to its accep­
tance. Or, perhaps he would defend a hypothetical analysis of such claims. 
That is, the claim that I could have done otherwise is understood as meaning 
“ I could have if  I had wanted to .”  Some other idea might have had “ the 
strength to dominate,”  though in fact that did not occur. Nishida takes ordina­
ry experience and ordinary opinions seriously, but not uncritically. They pro­
vide a starting point which must be evaluated in terms of his general principles 
about the nature of reality.
9 Inquiry, p. 96.
10 Inquiry, p. 96.
” Inquiry, pp. 96-97.
As he makes clear later, Nishida is claiming that we can really only speak of 
freedom of choice in cases where we do not see any grounds for preferring one 
alternative to another. This is a much more narrow view than most defenders 
of free will have in mind. Before he says more about this point, however, he 
characterizes the standard debate between those who defend free will and the 
determinists. This will make clearer that he is seeking a middle ground be­
tween two radically opposing positions, neither of which is acceptable.
Nishida points out that those who defend free will, and he is now apparent­
ly talking about philosophers and not about what people ordinarily say, ap­
peal to a “ mystical power”  that is completely independent of both internal 
and external conditions.10 Such an entity cannot be posited by someone who 
takes the interconnectedness and co-dependent arising of all things as seri­
ously as Nishida does. To defend such a view would also violate the principle 
of no-self. Thus, insofar as he speaks positively of freedom, Nishida cannot 
mean something like this.
Nishida then characterizes determinism as holding that there is a sufficient 
cause of everything, including the will.11 It is immediately made clear that 
Nishida is much more sympathetic to this view. He asserts that the claim that 
we can “ choose motives freely without any cause or reason” is “ totally mis­
taken.”  “ There must be a sufficient reason for our choice of motives,”  either
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in consciousness or beneath consciousness.12 He defends this view of choice as 
always determined by prior conditions by arguing that if our acts of willing 
were not caused we would not experience ourselves as responsible for them. 
They would instead be fortuitous events with external causes. Thus, Nishida 
concludes that an appeal to internal experience proves not freedom, but deter­
minism.13 Our choices are determined by * ‘disposition, habit, and charac­
ter.” 14
12 Inquiry, p. 97.
13 Inquiry, p. 97.
14 Inquiry, p. 96.
15 Inquiry, p. 97.
16 “The world described by physicists, like a line without width and a plane without 
thickness, is not something that actually exists.” Inquiry, p. 49.
17 Inquiry, p. 98.
18 Insofar as these are presented as non-physical, they are also abstractions, of 
course. The disembodied thought does not actually exist either.
19 Inquiry, p. 98.
Nevertheless, Nishida now criticizes the determinist position. He objects 
that the proponents of this view claim that all phenomena are controlled by 
the sort of law of mechanical necessity that is assumed to rule in the natural 
realm.15 This sort of reductionistic view is not acceptable to Nishida for whom 
the most appropriate way to characterize reality in general is as the phenome­
na of consciousness. Of course, he is neither an idealist nor a dualist. His 
point is that the perspective of the natural scientist is an abstraction that has 
great practical usefulness, but does not capture the whole of reality.16 Especial­
ly when we are speaking of human actions we must use categories that cannot 
be reduced to naturalistic terms. “ The reason behind the will . . .  is not a 
mechanical cause as described by determinists.” 17 A description of the disposi­
tions, habits, and character that determine our actions requires reference to 
patterns of interpretation and meaning that are not simply physicalistic,18 but 
it does not require reference to phenomena that are uncaused. This distinction 
between two versions of determinism is similar to the familiar distinction be­
tween hard and soft determinism, though Nishida’s soft determinism is harder 
than some in the extent to which it restricts the nature of freedom.
Nishida concludes that the common experience of being free must be under­
stood as the absence of “ external”  restraint, and not as the lack of any cause 
at all. “ When we function . . . from the internal character of the self, we feel 
ourselves to be free.” 19 An act we experience as free, then, is one that we 
experience as an accurate expression of who we are, and its freedom consists 
precisely in this expressive character, not in the absence of causal condi­
tions. Nishida recognizes that even this non-mechanistic determinism will be
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profoundly unsatisfying to many, so he offers a further clarification.
If “ freedom means to function according to one’s character/’ he con­
tinues, how does this differ from natural processes, which could also be said to 
fit this description? When water flows and fire bums are they not functioning 
according to their character?20 The issue here is about what distinguishes 
a process that is conscious. Nishida asserts that insofar as acts of willing are 
conscious they are aware not only of what is done but also of what is not 
done. This awareness of possibilities other than the actual events is what distin­
guishes the conscious from the natural.21
20 Inquiry, p. 98.
21 Inquiry, pp. 98-99.
22 Inquiry, p. 99.
It is here that we see how Nishida can maintain the prospect of genuine 
openness in the process of reality while still defending a form of determinism. 
Our awareness of other possibilities opens up a much greater range of varia­
tion for future development. Nishida’s determinism is not “ blind.”  Since the 
prior conditions in the case of conscious acts contain an awareness of alterna­
tives, future divergences are made possible that would not be possible without 
this awareness. As we become more knowledgeable about our characters and 
the possibilities in the world we act in, the consequences of our being who we 
are is affected by this awareness.22
It is clear, then, that Nishida defends determinism, though of a non- 
mechanistic sort, and “ reduces”  freedom to the experience of not being “ ex­
ternally” restrained. It is at this point that we might expect a discussion of the 
nature of responsibility, especially the question of whether we are responsible 
for our characters, but it is not forthcoming. Nevertheless, a number of con­
clusions seem to follow in a straightforward way from Nishida’s version of de­
terminism.
In the first place, the only sense in which it would seem that we can speak of 
responsibility is as purely causal. I am responsible for those actions that are 
caused by my character, i.e., my “ free”  acts. I cannot be responsible for my 
character, however, because I do not exist prior to or independent of my 
character. My character must have prior causes, just as my acts are caused by 
my character, but I do not exist apart from it so as to serve as its cause. Rather 
this character and the acts that emerge from it constitute the process that is 
me. Hence, my character is not chosen, it is given to me by the elaborate con­
text in which I come into being. Insofar as I am “ free,” I act in accordance 
with it, and the only time I do not do that is when “ external”  restraints pre­
vent it. (One of these “ external” restraints may be an inadequacy in my aware­
ness of the qualities of my character and their implications for the situations I
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am in. In other words, there is a sense in which I can act contrary to my charac­
ter out of ignorance.)
For the ordinary understanding, this analysis of responsibility will seem in­
adequate. Something important is missing, namely, the idea of moral conse­
quences, of being subject to praise and blame for the acts for which I am 
responsible. If my responsible acts are an expression of my character for 
which I am not responsible, what happens to the notions of praise and blame, 
of moral responsibility? Reflection on this question is an important source of 
the common notion of the “ mystical power” that is entirely independent of 
the process of reality that Nishida rejected earlier.
It is useful to note that on Nishida’s view actions of praising and blaming, 
insofar as they are responsible, free acts (in his sense), will only be expressions 
of the character of the person doing the praising and blaming. There is no 
ground independent of the contingencies of our own characters from which 
we can make judgments. Just as in the case of the notion of responsibility, we 
are left with a picture of the actor as under the control of forces over which 
the actor has no control. How is this to be reconciled with the ordinary sense 
of responsibility?
I would suggest that the crucial element in the ordinary notion of moral 
responsibility is not the idea of an independent agent as the ultimate cause and 
hence the justified focus of praise and blame, an idea that Nishida clearly can­
not accept, but rather the idea of obligations for certain kinds of actions, ac­
tions that are responsive to a particular situation. Being responsible in this 
sense is not connected with some notion of being the ultimate cause of the situ­
ation.
A good example of the kind of thing I have in mind is the response many 
people have to the recognition of past injustice in their communities. In many 
cases where it can be shown that the racial discrimination of past generations, 
for example, has resulted in unequal opportunities for some members of the 
community, many people accept the responsibility to make sacrifices so as to 
redress such injustices even though they were not themselves the cause of the 
injustices. Hence, they will approve funding special programs for the victims 
and will make contributions of money and time to help them. This can be seen 
as accepting responsibility for actions that the people accepting responsibility 
clearly did not themselves perform.
This offers an analysis of the salvageable content of the notion of respon­
sibility that fits well with Nishida’s view of freedom. Just as being free does 
not mean being the ultimate cause of your actions, so being responsible does 
not mean that either. Being free means acting in ways that accurately express 
your character, and being responsible means taking on the burden of lessening 
the suffering caused by past actions, whether these were your own actions or
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those of others.
There is a broader issue that arises at this point. In what sense are there 
good and bad actions for Nishida? In what sense is there a general moral prin­
ciple to which one can appeal? In what sense can we speak of good and bad 
characters? The answer is to see that these questions presuppose just the view 
of reality that Nishida is rejecting. As with the Zen tradition in general and 
with any form of determinism, reality is seen as valuationally neutral at the ul­
timate level. Rather than worrying about these sorts of traditional moral ques­
tions, the proper response is to allow your character to express itself. Nishida 
shares the common Buddhist expectation that when not constrained by ego­
ism, that expression will reflect the cooperative enhancement of life, i.e., com­
passion.
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